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Any advantage of giving jurisdiction to the federal courts must
be balanced against the disadvantages of taking away from the
State courts causes of action rooted in state law.'
-Justice Felix Frankfurter
Lawsuits filed in U.S. courts frequently antagonize foreign na-
tions. For example, a sizeable mass tort suit filed against a corporation
that is vital to a foreign state's economy is likely to capture the gov-
ernment's attention; in some instances, the lawsuit might compel the
foreign government to raise the issue directly with the United States
through diplomatic channels. As a result, the suit has potential ramifi-
cations for the United States' relations with that nation. Some courts
have held that these speculative U.S. foreign relations interests are
sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction over cases that are
otherwise based on state law.' In this Comment, I explore whether ju-
risdiction in such cases can be squared with the statutory and constitu-
tional limits of federal question jurisdiction.
The courts that have allowed federal question jurisdiction based
on a case's possible impact on U.S. foreign affairs have rested their
holdings on the federal common law of foreign relations. In Banco
Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino, the Supreme Court recognized that
some aspects of the United States' foreign affairs are governed exclu-
sively by federal law.' While Sabbatino left many unanswered ques-
t B.S. 1997, Northwestern University; J.D. 2003,The University of Chicago.
I Williams v Austrian, 331 US 642,680 (1947) (Frankfurter dissenting).
2 See, for example, Republic of Philippines v Marcos, 806 F3d 344,353 (2d Cir 1986) (find-
ing jurisdiction under § 1331 over a suit where the cause of action was a state law claim of con-
version).
3 376 US 398 (1964).
4 ld at 425 ("[Aln issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and func-
tion of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other mem-
bers of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.").
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tions about the scope and import of the newly discovered common
law, the Court has never held (nor implied) that every case that in-
volves U.S. foreign relations is governed by federal law.
This Comment argues that allowing federal jurisdiction over state
causes of action that merely implicate U.S. foreign affairs is inconsis-
tent with both the statutory and constitutional requirements for fed-
eral question jurisdiction. A close examination of the cases confront-
ing this issue reveals that federal law is not actually governing any as-
pect of the disputes. Rather, the federal common law is invoked only
as some vague background principle; with little analysis, the courts
simply assume that all things "foreign" are necessarily "federal." Cases
finding jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign rela-
tions are properly understood as examples of protective jurisdiction-
a theory that has never been accepted by the Supreme Court and that
would render the limitations of Article III superfluous. Protective ju-
risdiction is the federal courts' equivalent of the Yeti-many people
claim to have seen it, but no one can prove it exists. Originally devel-
oped in a pair of seminal law review articles by Professors Herbert
Wechsler and Paul Mishkin, this theory is an attempt to justify federal
jurisdiction in cases where the issue of federal law is, at best, remote.
My argument is structured as follows. In Part I, I introduce the
federal common law of foreign relations and examine the current
scope of federal question jurisdiction.' In Part II, I critique the handful
of cases considering jurisdiction based on the federal common law of
foreign relations and conclude that the cases allowing jurisdiction
cannot be explained as applications of existing federal question juris-
prudence. Part III considers an alternative explanation for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction in these cases-protective jurisdiction. After de-
scribing this doctrine, I explain why jurisdiction based on the federal
common law of foreign relations is properly understood as an exam-
ple of protective jurisdiction. I further argue that the problems with
protective jurisdiction underscore the weak theoretical and practical
foundations of jurisdiction based on the federal common law of for-
eign relations.
I. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND THE
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
Before considering when, if ever, federal question jurisdiction can
arise under the federal common law of foreign relations, a bit of back-
ground is necessary. In this Part, I discuss the scope of federal question
jurisdiction under both Article III and 28 USC § 1331. In addition, I
5 While the validity of the federal common law of foreign relations is not the focus of this
Comment, Part I briefly copsiders the weak foundations of this doctrine.
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briefly introduce the theory of protective jurisdiction.! Finally, I con-
sider the origins and scope of the federal common law of foreign rela-
tions.
A. The Scope of Constitutional and Statutory Federal
Question Jurisdiction
Under Article III, federal courts may assert jurisdiction (with
congressional authorization) over cases involving a federal question.
A case involving a federal question is any case "arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority."' In addition, 28 USC
§ 1331 similarly authorizes district courts to exercise jurisdiction over
"all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."'
Although Article III and § 1331 use similar language, it is well es-
tablished that the constitutional scope of federal question jurisdiction
is broader than the statutory grant.' In Osborn v Bank of the United
States,' the Court confronted the scope of Article III's "arising under"
clause." Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court endorsed an
expansive reading of the proper scope of Article III, holding that con-
stitutional federal question jurisdiction extends to any case in which
federal law "forms an ingredient of the original cause."'2 In contrast,
6 The theory of protective jurisdiction is discussed in detail in Part III.A.
7 US Const Art III, § 2.
8 28 USC § 1331 (2000).
9 See Verlinden B. V v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480,494-95 (1983). While this in-
terpretation is well settled today, its historical pedigree is uncertain. Section 1331 was part of the
Judiciary Act of 1875 that was enacted at the end of a session with little debate. See Felix Frank-
furter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial
System 65-69 (Macmillan 1928). There is little legislative history, but the record does contain the
following comment from the bill's sponsor, Senator Carpenter:
The act of 1789 did not confer the whole power which the Constitution conferred; it did not
do what the Supreme Court has said Congress ought to do; it did not perform what the Su-
preme Court has declared to be the duty of Congress. This bill does.... This bill gives pre-
cisely the power which the Constitution confers-nothing more, nothing less.
Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechslers The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 909 (Foundation 4th ed 1996). However, it is worth noting that
Carpenter was discussing the bill as a whole, and not just the federal question section. Id. While
some commentators have argued that this demonstrates that the Supreme Court has erred in its
reading of § 1331, see James H. Chadbourn and A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal
Questions, 90 U Pa L Rev 639,645-74 (1942), the interpretation has been consistently reaffirmed
by the Court. See, for example, Franchise Tax Board v Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
US 1,8 n 8 (1983).
10 22 US (9 Wheat) 738 (1824).
11 US Const Art III, § 2.
12 22 US (9Wheat) at 823.
A cause may depend on several questions of fact and law. Some of these may depend on
the construction of a law of the United States; others on principles unconnected with that
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the Court has interpreted the statutory grant of federal question juris-
diction in § 1331 more narrowly. Under the well-pleaded complaint
rule, jurisdiction is authorized by statute only when it is clear from the
face of the plaintiff's complaint that the case presents a question of
federal law.'3 One consequence of this rule, however, is that many
claims involving a federal question will be barred from federal court."
In an effort to justify an expansion of the federal courts' power
beyond the limits established in Osborn, several scholars have ad-
vanced a theory known as "protective jurisdiction." Although protec-
tive jurisdiction is explored more fully in Part III, it bears mentioning
at this point. The theory of protective jurisdiction attempts to justify
the extension of federal jurisdiction over cases governed by state law
where important federal interests are at stake. One version of this the-
ory would allow jurisdiction in any case in which Congress could have
enacted substantive federal law governing the dispute pursuant to
Article I." Another formulation would allow jurisdiction over any area
of law where an "articulated and active federal policy" is present. The
key element in both versions of protective jurisdiction is that federal
courts are empowered to hear cases based on state law between non-
diverse parties. The Supreme Court has never endorsed the theory of
protective jurisdiction.'7 At a minimum, protective jurisdiction would
represent a departure from the well-pleaded complaint rule. At worst,
protective jurisdiction lacks any ingredient of federal law and thus
represents an extension of judicial power beyond the bounds of Arti-
cle III.
B. The Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations
Nearly forty years ago, the Supreme Court held for the first time
that the Constitution implicitly requires that certain aspects of U.S.
law ... [It is] a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or right set up by the
party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution or law of the United States,
and sustained by the opposite construction.
Id at 821-22.The Supreme Court reaffirmed this interpretation in Verlinden, 461 US at 492-93.
13 See Louisville & Nashville Railroad v Mottley, 211 US 149, 152 (1908) ("It is not enough
that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the de-
fense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States.").
14 See David P. Currie, Federal Jurisdiction in a Nutshell 67 (West 4th ed 1999) (noting that
the Mottley rule prevents removal from state courts when a defense based on federal law is
raised).
15 See Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 L &
Contemp Probs 216,225 (1948).
16 Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum L Rev 157, 192
(1953).
17 See Mesa v California, 489 US 121,137 (1989) (declining the government's invitation to
decide the case on the basis of protective jurisdiction and noting that the Court has never em-
braced this theory).
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foreign affairs be governed exclusively by federal law. In this Part, I
explore the foundations of this newly discovered federal common law
of foreign relations.
1. Post-Erie federal common law.
Although the Supreme Court famously stated in Erie v Tomp-
kins" that "there is no federal general common law,""' Erie changed,
but did not eliminate, federal common law. Erie simply prevents fed-
eral courts from developing general common law without authoriza-
tion from Congress or the Constitution. Federal courts continue to
develop and apply federal common law in areas where such authoriza-
tion is present..2' One important feature of post-Erie common law is
that, unlike its predecessor, it is part of the "Laws of the United
States" under the Supremacy Clause.22 Thus, federal common law is
binding upon the states and may even preempt conflicting state law.
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance on how courts
should determine whether they are authorized to create federal com-
mon law. In most cases, courts rely on an implicit authorization from
Congress to fill gaps in a statutory scheme.' The Supreme Court has
also found authorization to create common law based on the Consti-
tution's text. For example, Article III's grant of judicial power over
"all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"" provides the basis
for the federal common law governing admiralty.' Finally, and perhaps
18 304 US 64 (1938).
19 Id at 78.
20 This type of general common law is usually associated with Swift v Tyson, 41 US (16 Pet)
1 (1842).
21 See, for example. Clearfield Trust Co v United States, 318 US 363.366-67 (1943) ("We
agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the rule of [Erie] does not apply to this action. The
rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by fed-
eral rather than local law."). See also Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Fed-
eral Common Law. 39 NYU L Rev 383.405-07 (1964).
22 See US Const Art VI. cl 2.
23 See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law. 99 Harv L
Rev 883. 890-94 (1986) (defining federal common law as "any rule of federal law created by a
court (usually but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not clearly
suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or congressional" and stating that "federal com-
mon law includes much we think of as interpretation: it leaves no clear-cut line between federal
common law and federal interpretational law").
24 USConstArt1ll.§2. cl .
25 This view originated in Justice Story's opinion in DeLovio v Boit, 7 F Cases 418 (CC D
Mass 1815) (examining the origins and development of admiralty jurisdiction). But see Jack
Goldsmith. Federal Courts. Foreign Affairs, and Federalism. 83 Va L Rev 1617. 1627-28 n 33
(1997) (noting that the federal common law of admiralty is probably closer to a structural au-
thorization).
Another example of federal common law that might be based on the constitutional text is
the law governing disputes between states. The textual support for this common law also comes
from Art Ill, § 2, cl 1, which authorizes jurisdiction over interstate disputes. See Field. 99 Harv L
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most controversially, the Court has recognized federal common law
authorized implicitly by the structure of the Constitution." Such a
structural inference requires the implication of "uniquely federal in-
terests."27 These federal interests are thought to justify the creation of
federal common law because of the need for uniformity in a given
area. The federal common law of foreign relations is one example of
judge-made law authorized by the Constitution's structure.
2. Sabbatino and the origins of the federal common law of
foreign relations.
The federal common law of foreign relations was first recognized
by the Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino.2 In
Sabbatino, a Cuban bank sought to recover the proceeds from the sale
of a sugar shipment that the Cuban government had expropriated
from a company owned by United States residents. The defendant ar-
gued that the bank was not entitled to the sale proceeds because the
expropriation violated customary international law."9 In response, the
bank invoked the act of state doctrine, an international law doctrine
that provides that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
of the acts of the government of another done within its own terri-
tory." ' The Court concluded that the act of state doctrine applied to
the Cuban government's actions and accordingly the expropriation
was not subject to legal challenge in U.S. courts.'
Justice Harlan's majority opinion explored the legal basis for the
act of state doctrine. Harlan concluded that the doctrine was not re-
quired by the Constitution, by any federal statute nor by interna-
tional law." Nevertheless, the Court determined that the act of state
doctrine was a matter of federal, not state law. Harlan stated that "an
issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and
function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our
relationships with other members of the international community
must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.""
Rev at 891 (cited in note 23). See also Illinois v Milwaukee, 406 US 91, 100 (1972) (holding that
§ 1331 federal jurisdiction exists over cases involving interstate waters and pollution, because
such cases arise under federal common law).
26 For a discussion of federal common law based on such structural inferences, see Thomas
W. Merrill. The Federal Common Law Powers of the Federal Courts. 52 U Chi L Rev 1 (1985).
27 Boyle v United Technologies Corp. 487 US 500. 5f14 (1988).
28 376 US 398 (1964).
29 Id at 401-08,
31 Id at 416. quoting Underhill v Hernandez. 168 US 250.252 (1897).
31 See Sabbatino. 376 US at 439.
32 ld at 421-27.
33 id at 421-23.
34 ld at 425 ("It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have rules like the act of state
1492 [70:1487
Protective Jurisdiction over Foreign Affairs
While not explicitly using the term "common law," the Supreme
Court had recognized a new area of federal judge-made law with
"constitutional underpinnings."" In doing so, Harlan emphasized the
uniquely federal interests implicated by the act of state doctrine. The
Court supported its decision with previous instances where the crea-
tion of federal common law was found warranted by the strength of
the federal interests at stake.i Because of the interest in uniformity in
the United States' dealings with foreign countries, the Court con-
cluded that the act of state doctrine was a creature of federal law.?
Sabbatino left the precise scope of the federal common law of foreign
relations uncertain. However, the Court made clear that the applica-
tion and development of the act of state doctrine was based upon the
Court's own analysis of the foreign relations issues at stake. Accord-
ing to Professor Henkin, Sabbatino established
an independent power for the federal courts to make [foreign
relations] law on their own authority. It was the federal judiciary
that decided that the foreign relations of the United States re-
quired the act of state doctrine; and it was the judiciary that was
deciding, in Sabbatino, that the foreign relations of the United
doctrine in mind when it decided Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.").
35 Id at 423 (internal quotation marks omitted). While these "underpinnings" did not man-
date the act of state doctrine, the Court found that federalism and separation of powers concerns
were sufficient to warrant federalizing the doctrine. "[The act of state doctrine] arises out of the
basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It con-
cerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of deci-
sions in the area of international relations." Id.
36 ld at 426, citing D'Oench, Duhme & Co v Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. 315 US 447
(1942) and Clearfield Trust Co v United States, 318 US 363 (1943). The Court acknowledged that
these cases were different because each relied on a congressional enactment as the basis for fed-
eral common law and suggested that federalizing this area of foreign relations was more analo-
gous to the law governing coastal waters. See Sabbatino. 376 US at 426. However, as Professor
Redish has pointed out, this comparison is strained because federal law makes more sense in the
interstate waters context where it is unclear which state law should apply. See Martin H. Redish.
Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 95 (Michie 2d ed 1990).
37 See Sabbatino,376 US at 427.
38 Lower courts and commentators have embraced the development of federal common
law in a number of areas: private international law, including forum non conveniens. choice of
law. forum selection clauses, and the enforcement of foreign judgments: substantive areas of state
law, such as torts and contracts: dormant foreign commerce clause: state foreign affairs actions:
and perhaps customary international law. See Goldsmith. 83 Va L Rev at 1632-41 (cited in note
25). -
39 See Sabbatino. 376 US at 423 (noting that while the Constitution does not require the
act of state doctrine, it "does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review
the validity of foreign acts of state"). See also Goldsmith, 83 Va L Rev at 1628 (cited in note 25)
("[T]he Court based both the need for, and the content of. the doctrine on its own independent
analysis of the foreign relations interests of the United States.").
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States did not require (or permit) an exception for acts of state
that violate international law.
Several years after Sabbatino, the Court further expanded the
federal courts' powers over foreign affairs in Zschernig v Miller.
Zschernig involved an Oregon statute that denied inheritance rights to
East German heirs." The Court invalidated the statute even though it
was not in conflict with any federal statute or treaty.41 The Court con-
cluded that the statute was "an intrusion by the State into the field of
foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and
the Congress."4' Taken together, Sabbatino and Zschernig suggest a
broad federalization of foreign affairs issues. In practice, however, the
scope of these decisions remains uncertain.' Since Zschernig, the Su-
preme Court has not invalidated any state statute based on the dor-
mant foreign affairs power;46 the Court has also provided little guid-
ance on the common law ushered in by Sabbatino.
While a full critique of the federal common law of foreign rela-
tions is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is worth emphasizing
several problems with this doctrine. First, Sabbatino's reliance on the
Constitution's structure as a basis for authorization is troubling. Ab-
sent any textual support for creating federal common law, how does
the Court determine when the Constitution's structure provides such
authorization? As Professor Henkin notes, this raises the possibility
41 Louis Henkin. Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 139 (Clarendon 2d ed
1996).
41 389 US 429 (1968).
42 Id at 430.
43 Id at 441.
44 Id at 432.
45 While the federal common law of foreign relations has been widely accepted by com-
mentators. see Bradford R. Clark. Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U Pa
L Rev 1245, 1292 (1996), it has recently come under attack. For a general discussion, see Gold-
smith. 83 Va L Rev 1617 (cited in note 25) (arguing that the federal common law of foreign rela-
tions lacks justification from either a historical or functional perspective): A.M. Weisburd, State
Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 Yale J Intl L 1 (1995) (advocating a more lim-
ited approach to federalizing foreign affairs issues).
46 Consider Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000) (holding that a
Massachusetts law barring state entities from buying goods from persons or companies doing
business with Burma was invalid under the Supremacy Clause on the grounds that it improperly
interfered with the objectives of a federal statute targeting Burma).
The Supreme Court recently relied on Zschernig in American Insurance Association v
Garamendi, 123 S Ct 2374 (2003). Garamendi struck down a California statute that required in-
surers doing business in the state to disclose certain information on Holocaust-era policies issued
in Europe. While Justice Souter invoked Zschernig to support his analysis, see id at 2388-90, his
holding does not appear to rest on dormant foreign affairs preemption (the opinion is not a
model of clarity). Rather, the Court found that the California scheme conflicted with a series of
executive agreements signed by President Clinton settling Holocaust-related claims. Id at 2390-
92. See also id at 2399-400 (Ginsburg dissenting) (criticizing the majority's reliance on Zscher-
nig).
1494 [70:1487
Protective Jurisdiction over Foreign Affairs
that the Court can simply declare other areas "intrinsically federal"
and preempt state law.47 Second, it took the Court 150 years to dis-
cover that the Constitution empowers federal courts to override state
law in areas that are somehow classified as "foreign affairs." Indeed,
twenty years before Zschernig, the Court rejected the argument that
the Constitution contained a dormant foreign affairs power; Justice
Douglas dismissed the argument as "farfetched."" Despite these con-
49cerns, the federal common law of foreign relations seems here to stay.
However, the Supreme Court has yet to address this doctrine's impli-
cations for federal question jurisdiction.
II. WHEN DOES JURISDICTION ARISE UNDER THE FEDERAL
COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS?
Even if one accepts the federal common law of foreign rela-
tions-despite its shaky theoretical foundations-the jurisdictional
implications of Sabbatino are uncertain. Several courts have addressed
the question of when, if ever, the federal common law of foreign rela-
tions can provide the basis for federal question jurisdiction. "' In this
Part, I analyze these cases and conclude that several courts have erred
in allowing jurisdiction; a speculative impact on U.S. foreign affairs
does not provide the element of federal law necessary to satisfy the
requirements of § 1331.
A. Cases Considering Jurisdiction under the Federal Common Law
of Foreign Relations
The handful of cases considering the relationship between the
federal common law of foreign relations and federal question jurisdic-
tion are characterized by their cursory treatment of the issues. Typi-
cally, one party argues that the federal common law of foreign rela-
tions is somehow implicated because of the case's potential impact on
U.S. foreign affairs. Despite this vague invocation of the federal com-
mon law, neither the parties nor the courts have shown much interest
in identifying exactly what substantive issue is governed by federal
law. On this basis alone, however, several courts have found federal
question jurisdiction appropriate.
47 See Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 Colum
L Rev 805,815-17 (1964).
48 Clark v Allen, 331 US 503, 517 (1947) ("What California has done will have some inci-
dental or indirect effect in foreign countries. But that is true of many state laws which none
would claim cross the forbidden line.").
49 See generally Clark, 144 U Pa L Rev 1245 (cited in note 45).
5( Sabbatino did not address this issue because there was diversity jurisdiction. See 376 US
at 421 n 20 (declining to consider whether federal question jurisdiction was present).
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Republic of Philippines v Marcos' was the first case in which a
court found federal question jurisdiction based on the federal com-
mon law of foreign relations. In Marcos, the Republic of the Philip-
pines sued its former dictator to enjoin him from disposing of several
New York properties that he allegedly purchased with misappropri-
ated government funds.2 The new Filipino government had issued an
executive order freezing the Marcoses' assets and appealing to foreign
governments to freeze assets in their countries as well. '" Although the
cause of action was a state law claim for conversion," the Second Cir-
cuit found jurisdiction under § 1331. In his opinion for the court, Judge
Oakes stated that "the plaintiff's claims necessarily require determina-
tions that will directly and significantly affect American foreign rela-
tions."" Because of this impact on U.S. foreign relations, the court held
that the case was governed at least in part by federal law."
In applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, Judge Oakes first
considered whether state law had been completely preempted by the
federal common law of foreign relations. The court concluded that the
state cause of action was "probably" displaced by federal law: "an ac-
tion brought by a foreign government against its former head of state
arises under federal common law because of the necessary implica-
tions of such an action for United States foreign relations."" The court
provided little justification for extending a doctrine that the Supreme
Court has found applicable on only two occasions.'" Indeed, the court
failed to address how federal common law could trigger a doctrine
that has congressional intent as its touchstone. 9
51 806 F2d 344 (2d Cir 1986).
52 Idat347.
53 Id at 353.
54 ldat354.
55 Id at 352, citing Sabbatino, 376 US 398.
56 See Marcos, 806 F2d at 351-53. Interestingly, the Marcos court supported its position by
quoting Sabbatino as stating that "our relationships with other members of the international-
community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law." Id at 352. This reliance on
Sabbatino is somewhat misleading; the full quotation is as follows: "[h]owever, we are con-
strained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence
and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other
members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal
law." Sabbatino, 376 US at 425.
57 Marcos, 806 F2d at 354. In determining whether state law was preempted, the court re-
lied on the Supreme Court's discussion of Avco Corp v Aero Lodge No 735, 390 US 557 (1968),
in Franchise Tax Board v Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 US 1,23-24 (1983).
58 See Avco, 390 US at 560-62; Metropolitan Life Insurance v Taylor, 481 US 58, 64-67
(1987). See also Republic of Venezuela v Philip Morris, 287 F3d 192, 199 (DC Cir 2002) (Williams
concurring) (rejecting a similar argument because the defendants had not offered "an analytical
basis for extending the complete preemption doctrine beyond the two statutes that the Supreme
Court has held effectuated such a preemption").
59 See Taylor, 481 US at 66. For a thoughtful analysis of the relationship between complete
preemption and the well-pleaded complaint rule, see Anderson v H&R Block, Inc, 287 F3d 1038,
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The Second Circuit did not rest its holding on the complete pre-
emption basis alone. The court also determined that there was a fed-
eral issue presented by the plaintiff's state law cause of action. " The
federal issue was whether to honor the request of the foreign govern-
ment to freeze assets that may have been misappropriated by a former
head of state." Without identifying how federal law rather than State
Department policy governed this question, Judge Oakes concluded
that this question must be governed by federal common law because
of the need for uniformity.2 Thus, the Republic of the Philippines's
state law cause of action presented a federal issue sufficient to provide
a basis for jurisdiction under § 1331.
The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Torres v South-
ern Peru Copper Corp." The plaintiffs were seven hundred Peruvians
allegedly harmed by emissions from smelting and refining operations
in Peru. They filed suit in Texas alleging state claims of negligence, in-
tentional tort, and nuisance. Peru protested the lawsuit by filing a let-
ter with the State Department and submitting an amicus brief." The
Fifth Circuit said the case struck "not only at vital economic interests
but also at Peru's sovereign interests" because of the importance of
the mining industry to the Peruvian economy. The court concluded
that "[o]n the record before [it].... plaintiffs' complaint raise[d] sub-
stantial questions of federal common law by implicating important
foreign policy concerns."7 Without further analysis, the court held that
federal question jurisdiction was present.
1040-44 (11th Cir 2002).
0) See Marcos, 806 F2d at 354, citing Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc v Thompson, 478
US 804,810 (1986).
61 See Marcos, 806 F2d at 354.
62 See id.
63 113 F3d 540 (5th Cir 1997).
64 See id at 541.
65 See id at 542 ("Peru maintains that the litigation implicates some of its most vital inter-
ests and, hence, will affect its relations with the United States.").
66 Id at 543. The court emphasized the high degree of government involvement in the
mining industry in Peru, including the fact that the government owned the land on which the
mining company operated and owned the minerals being extracted.
67 Id.
68 See id. In Pacheco de Perez v AT&T Co, 139 F3d 1368 (11th Cir 1998), the Eleventh Cir-
cuit adopted the reasoning of Torres and Marcos but declined to exercise jurisdiction after de-
termining that the foreign policy issues presented were speculative. See id at 1377-78. The court
also relied heavily on the fact that the foreign government involved (Venezuela) had not pro-
tested the suit. See id at 1378 ("[The court] think[s] it significant, for purposes of this case, that
the Venezuelan government has taken no position on whether this lawsuit proceeds in the
United States or in Venezuela.").
As discussed in Part I11, this holding illustrates several problems with the Marcos/Torres ap-
proach. First, it creates uncertainty in federal question jurisdiction. In every case, the parties will
not know whether federal jurisdiction is present until a court of appeals has had an opportunity
to determine whether the suit is somehow important enough to trigger federal interests. Second,
2003] 1,497
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Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit took a different approach to
this issue in Patrickson v Dole Food Co," which involved a class action
suit brought by banana workers in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala,
and Panama for exposure to toxic pesticides.7' The workers brought
suit against Dole in a Hawaii state court, and Dole removed to federal
court.' On removal, the federal district court found federal question
jurisdiction and dismissed the case for forum non conveniens 2 On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit held there was no federal question jurisdic-
tion." Judge Kozinski noted that the court was not required "to evalu-
ate any act of state or apply any principle of international law."" He
characterized Dole's argument based on the federal common law of
foreign relations as an "exception" to the well-pleaded complaint rule.
The court found such an exception unwarranted, however, because
sufficient uniformity on issues of federal law was assured by the Su-
preme Court having the final say on any interpretation of federal
common law." In addition, Judge Kozinski noted that Congress could
have granted jurisdiction over this class of cases, but chose not to. He
also emphasized that the interests of the various foreign governments
would still be implicated if the case were litigated in federal rather
than state court." Finally, he reasoned that the court was not compe-
tent to evaluate the diplomatic interests of the United States, and that
courts should avoid this type of arm-chair foreign policy analysis."
federal judges are simply not competent to make these foreign policy judgments. There is no ob-
vious reason to conclude that a suit hostile to the Peruvian mining industry (Torres) is more im-
portant to U.S. interests than a suit against AT&T involving a gas pipeline explosion in Vene-
zuela (Pacheco de Perez).
69 251 F3d 795 (9th Cir 2001), affd in part, cert dismissed in part, 123 S Ct 1655 (2003)
(dismissing writ of certiorari in No 01-593 on the grounds that the Dole petitioners did not seek
review of the portion of the Ninth Circuit's ruling which held that Dole could not base removal
on the federal common law of foreign relations).
70 251 F3d at 798.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 Id at 804-05.
74 Id at 800.
75 See id at 802 ("Ultimately, the Supreme Court has the final say on any question of fed-
eral law, whether it arises in federal or state court, and this is thought sufficient to ensure na-
tionwide uniformity in areas as diverse as criminal procedure, patent law and labor law.").
76 See id at 803 (noting that Congress had provided jurisdiction in a number of other types
of cases that implicate foreign relations).
77 See id ("That the case is litigated in federal court, rather than in state court, will not re-
duce the impact of the case on the foreign government.").
78 See id at 804, citing Goldsmith, 83 Va L Rev at 1667 (cited in note 25). See also In re To-
bacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 100 F Supp 2d 31,38 (D DC 2000) (finding no
jurisdiction in tobacco litigation involving several foreign governments). The D.C. Circuit has re-
cently reviewed this case on mandamus and held that it was not clear error for the district court
to refuse jurisdiction. See Republic of Venezuela, 287 F3d at 199. In his concurring opinion, Judge
Stephen F. Williams argued that the issues were "a good deal subtler than the majority opinion
lets on." Id at 200. However, Williams concluded that even if the case presented issues governed
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B. Why Jurisdiction under the Federal Common Law of
Foreign Relations Is Inconsistent with Existing Federal
Question Jurisprudence
None of the courts addressing federal jurisdiction under the fed-
eral common law of foreign relations has provided a satisfactory
analysis. The cases finding jurisdiction- Torres and Marcos-are, at
the very least, inconsistent with the well-pleaded complaint rule. In
each of these cases the plaintiffs' suits were based on state law. Fed-
eral question jurisdiction is appropriate in such circumstances only
when the plaintiff's right to relief depends on the resolution of a sub-
stantial question of federal law or when a federal cause of action
completely preempts a state cause of action."' State tort suits that have
speculative implications for U.S. foreign policy meet neither of these
criteria. The courts finding jurisdiction based on the federal common
law of foreign relations have erred, in part, by simply assuming that all
things involving foreign relations are necessarily federal.
The Marcos and Torres courts seem to ignore that the Supreme
Court has never suggested that every case implicating foreign rela-
tions must be governed by federal law. Indeed, the Court has allowed
states to regulate activity affecting U.S. foreign relations even when
the regulation has clearly antagonized foreign governments.'" It is in-
sufficient for courts to simply point to a suit's potential impact on U.S.
foreign relations and conclude that federal common law is triggered.
Moreover, even if the federal common law is somehow relevant, nei-
ther the courts nor the parties articulated what legal issues must be
governed by federal law." Vague references to U.S. foreign policy werethe only federal ingredient offered.
by federal common law, these issues arose only as a defense and thus could not satisfy the well-
pleaded complaint rule, See id.
79 See Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 US at 23-24, citing Avco, 390 US 557.
8( For example, in Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 US 298
(1994), the Court declined to preempt a state tax scheme under the dormant foreign commerce
clause despite repeated complaints from foreign governments. See id at 324 n 22 ("The govern-
ments of many of our trading partners have expressed their strong disapproval of California's
method of taxation.").
The case of Angel Francisco Breard provides another telling example of the relevance of
states' interests to foreign affairs. Breard was a Paraguayan citizen who was convicted of murder
in Virginia. Breard appealed, claiming that his rights under the Vienna Convention (which guar-
antees certain procedural protections to expatriates) were violated. The federal government re-
quested that the governor of Virginia stay the execution, but conceded that it was powerless to
interfere in the state proceedings. See Breard v Greene, 523 US 371 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley and
Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to US. Foreign Relations, 92 Am J Intl L
675, 676 (1998) ("[Tjhe Department of State ... acknowledged Virginia's right to go forward
with Breard's execution, and with great reluctance requested that it not do so.") (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
81 Only Marcos identified the purported federal legal issue, but as mentioned above it is
unclear how deference to the Philippine government is a question of common law, rather than
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This is not to say that federal question jurisdiction could never
arise under the federal common law of foreign relations. Depending
upon the scope of the federal common law of foreign relations, it is
possible to conceive of a tort claim based on federal common law.
However, this remote possibility is no reason to depart from the base-
line for statutory federal question jurisdiction: the plaintiff's complaint
should determine whether the cause of action is state or federal. As
the plaintiffs in both Marcos and Torres chose a state law cause of ac-
tion, federal question jurisdiction was inappropriate; no issue of fed-
eral law-including the federal common law of foreign relations-was
presented by either plaintiff's complaint.
Another problem that characterizes Marcos, and in particular
Torres, is that these courts misconceived the Supreme Court's federal
question jurisprudence. These opinions simply assert that foreign rela-
tions is an area of important federal concern (with little explanation)
and rely solely on this assertion to conclude that there must be federal
question jurisdiction. Marcos represents a plausible attempt to work
within the doctrinal framework of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
However, it still failed to decide conclusively whether the plaintiff's
cause of action was completely preempted by federal law; the court
noted that the action was "probably" preempted, but provided no
analysis." In addition, the court based jurisdiction on finding a sub-
stantial question of federal law, but declined to identify the federal law
at issue.! Torres is an even more egregious application of the well-
pleaded complaint rule. There, the court rested its decision on a sub-
stantial question of federal law, but provided no explanation of what
the federal question might be."
While Judge Kozinski's analysis in Patrickson is closer to the
mark, it also has several flaws. Although Kozinski was correct that
Sabbatino says nothing about jurisdiction, he was wrong to suggest
that it has no implications for jurisdiction. Issues of federal common
law, if properly presented by the plaintiff's complaint, are a valid basis
for jurisdiction; the recognition of a new area of common law neces-
executive branch policy.
82 The Supreme Court has held that a case that arises under federal common law is suffi-
cient to create federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. See Illinois v City of Milwaukee, 406
US 91, 100 (1972) (-We see no reason not to give 'laws' its natural meaning, and therefore con-
clude § 1331 jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those
of statutory origin.") (citations omitted).
S3 Marcos, 806 F2d at 354.
' See id (stating that the decision whether to recognize the foreign government's request
is governed by federal law). However, the court later said that the Philippine government did not
allege that its executive order had any legal force. See id at 360 ("[Aln examination of Executive
Orders Nos. I and 2 shows that they do not purport to seize the United States properties of the
Marcoses, nor does the Republic seek to enforce these orders as the basis for a recovery.").
85 7lhrres. 113 F3d at 543.
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sarily has jurisdictional implications. In addition, Kozinski mischarac-
terized the argument in favor of federal question jurisdiction as an
"exception" to the well-pleaded complaint rule. The defendants
sought to remove the case by arguing that the plaintiffs' complaint on
its face raised issues of federal law. While I believe Kozinski was cor-
rect to reject this argument, state suits that actually present questions
of federal law, common law or otherwise, are not exceptions to, but
applications of, the well-pleaded complaint rule.
In sum, the cases finding jurisdiction based on foreign relations
common law cannot be squared with the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Whether these cases can be squared with the broader constitutional
limits of Article III is a more difficult question to which I now turn.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION UNDER THE
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
Standard federal question analysis does not adequately justify ju-
risdiction based on the federal common law of foreign relations. In
light of this problem, it is possible that an alternative theory of juris-
diction is at work. In this Part, I argue that jurisdiction based on the
federal common law is actually a type of protective jurisdiction. When
properly understood as protective jurisdiction, the illegitimacy of fed-
eral question jurisdiction based on a suit's speculative impact on U.S.
foreign relations becomes more evident.
A. What Is Protective Jurisdiction?
There is no universally accepted definition of protective jurisdic-
tion. It is usually understood as congressionally authorized federal
court. jurisdiction over cases that do not directly present questions of
substantive federal law. Jurisdiction in these cases is based on the
need to "protect" or promote federal interests by granting a federal
forum for cases that otherwise would not meet the requirements of
Article III. This theory is most closely associated with Professors Her-
bert Wechsler and Paul Mishkin, two scholars that articulated differ-
ent formulations of protective jurisdiction over fifty years ago87 De-
86 For another formulation, see Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L Rev 542, 546-47 (1983) ("The concept of protective jurisdic-
tion tends to arise in situations in which Congress has authorized a federal forum, the accepted
minimum requirements for a case to arise under federal law are not met, and no other basis for
federal jurisdiction can be found under Article III of the Constitution.").
87 See Mishkin, 53 Colum L Rev at 192 (cited in note 16); Wechsler, 13 L & Contemp Probs
at 225 (cited in note 15). There is a wealth of recent scholarship on the theory of protective juris-
diction. See, for example, Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over Courts in Nonfederal
Cases, 1995 BYU L Rev 731; John Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction to
Disputes Outside Article Il: A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of Bankruptcy, 87 Nw U L
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spite their differences, both versions of protective jurisdiction are in
tension with the scope of judicial power established by Article III.
Wechsler's theory of protective jurisdiction asserts that if Con-
gress has the power to regulate a particular matter, it could take the
lesser step of providing federal court jurisdiction." That is, if Congress
has power under the Commerce Clause to regulate medical malprac-
tice in general, it should also have the power to provide a federal fo-
rum for malpractice cases without establishing substantive law in this
area. Wechsler tried to bootstrap this theory to Article III by arguing
that the jurisdictional statute provides the "federal law" under which
the case arises."
Mishkin, who was critical of Wechsler's formulation, argued that
protective jurisdiction was appropriate where Congress has an "articu-
lated and active federal policy regulating a field."" For example, the
Supreme Court held that Congress lacked the Article I power to enact
the Gun-Free School Zones Act in United States v Lopez."' Accepting
this ruling, Mishkin would still allow for federal jurisdiction over a
similar state statute because Congress has an active policy in favor of
both ensuring safe schools and limiting gun violence. Despite the dif-
ferences between the two scholars, at the core of their theories is the
notion that claims governed by state substantive law can be heard in
federal courts without a clear Article III basis.
Accepting either theory of protective jurisdiction would render
the limitations of Article III essentially meaningless. The Supreme
Court has never accepted protective jurisdiction and indeed has de-
clined to do so despite government urging." The most famous critique
Rev 1188 (1993); Goldberg-Ambrose, 30 UCLA L Rev 542 (cited in note 86); Scott A.
Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 NYU L Rev 933 (1982).
88 See Wechsler, 13 L & Contemp Probs at 224-25 (cited in note 15):
Where, for example, Congress by the commerce power can declare as federal law that con-
tracts of a given kind are valid and enforceable, it must be free to take the lesser step of
drawing suits upon such contracts to the district courts without displacement of the states as
sources of the operative, substantive law.
See also Alexander M. Bickel and Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv L Rev 1 (1957) ("The point is simply that providing a
forum for the enforcement of state law in a field in which Congress could occupy is itself a spe-
cies of regulation, a way of seeking a degree of uniformity while leaving the maximum room for
the exercise of initiative by the states.").
89 See Wechsler, 13 L & Contemp Probs at 225 (cited in note 15) ("A case is one 'arising
under' federal law within the sense of Article II whenever it is comprehended in a valid grant of
jurisdiction as well as when its disposition must be governed by the national law.").
9) Mishkin, 53 Colum L Rev at 192 (cited in note 16).
9i 514 US 549 (1995). While the statute at issue in Lopez was criminal, assume for the sake
of this hypothetical that both the federal statute and its state counterparts provided civil reme-
dies against parties who brought guns within a school zone.
92 See Mesa v California, 489 US 121, 137 (1989):
At oral argument the Government urged upon us a theory of 'protective jurisdiction' to
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of protective jurisdiction was provided by Justice Frankfurter's dissent
in Textile Workers Union of America v Lincoln Mills of Alabama,"3
which considered the theories advanced by both Wechsler and Mish-
kin. In rejecting protective jurisdiction, Justice Frankfurter stated that
"[t]he theory must have as its sole justification a belief in the inade-
quacy of state tribunals in determining state law."" He also rejected
Wechsler's theory that Congress could provide protective jurisdiction
as long as it had the power to enact substantive law under Article I:
"[s]urely the truly technical restrictions of Article III are not met or
respected by a beguiling phrase that the greater power here must nec-
essarily include the lesser.""
Professor David Currie has expanded on this last point by noting
that if there is no federal law to interpret, the reasons for federal ques-
tion jurisdiction-uniformity of interpretation and the vindication of
federal rights-are not an issue."' Currie has also noted that if jurisdic-
tion can arise under the jurisdictional statute itself, then there is essen-
tially no limit to the federal judicial power based on Article III. Under
this view, the substantive law governing a case would become irrele-
vant. Assuming Congress passed a jurisdictional statute, federal ques-
tion jurisdiction would automatically be constitutional; in short, the ju-
risdictional inquiry would be tautological. Moreover, Article III con-
templates situations in which state courts are not to be trusted in ap-
plying state law. In such cases, the Constitution provides subject mat-
ter jurisdiction in federal court based on the diversity of the parties
even if the issues are solely of state law. One could plausibly argue
(while recognizing the weakness of expressio unius arguments) that by
negative implication the Constitution does not allow suits based on
state law to be brought in federal court if they do not meet Article III
requirements.
avoid these Art. III difficulties .... We have, in the past, not found the need to adopt a the-
ory of 'protective jurisdiction' to support Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction, and we do not
see any need for doing so here.
(internal citations omitted).
93 353 US 448 (1957).
94 Idat475.
95 Id at 474. As Professor David Currie notes, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
one example in constitutional law where the greater power does not necessarily include the
lesser. See Currie, Federal Jurisdiction in a Nutshell at 63 (cited in note 14). On the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4, 6-7 (1988) ("In its canonical
form, this doctrine holds that even if a state has absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege
or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly 'coerce,' 'pressure,'
or 'induce' the waiver of constitutional rights.").
96 See Currie, Federal Jurisdiction in a Nutshell at 63 (cited in note 14) ("Absent federal law
there is no need for uniformity and no federal right to vindicate.").
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B. Jurisdiction Based on the Federal Common Law of Foreign
Relations Is an Example of Protective Jurisdiction
A form of both Mishkin's and Wechsler's theories of protective
jurisdiction is at work in the cases resting jurisdiction on the federal
common law of foreign relations. At a minimum, none of these cases
can be explained as an application of § 1331- each cause of action is
based entirely on state law. More importantly, these cases have no
readily identifiable ingredient of federal law. The federal common law
of foreign relations is invoked at a general level, but it does not pro-
vide the substantive law governing any aspect of these cases. Thus,
these cases lack even the minimum federal element necessary to sat-
isfy the requirements of Article III.
Under Mishkin's formulation of protective jurisdiction, the cru-
cial element necessary for protective jurisdiction is an "articulated and
active" federal policy regulating an area of law.7 Each of the courts
finding jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign rela-
tions relied on the importance of the case to the foreign relations in-
terests of the United States. For example, in Marcos the court argued
that "an examination shows that the plaintiff's claims necessarily re-
quire determinations that will directly and significantly affect Ameri-
can foreign relations."" Similarly, in Torres the court emphasized the
important federal interests raised by the plaintiff's tort suit." Thus, the
exercise of jurisdiction in each case is "protective" of the federal in-
terest in American foreign policy.
Wechsler's formulation of protective jurisdiction presents a dif-
ferent wrinkle. His theory turns not on active federal regulation of an
area, but rather on Congress's Article I powers. If Congress has the
power to enact substantive law in a given area, it can take the lesser
step of providing jurisdiction over state claims." In each case finding
jurisdiction under the common law of foreign relations, it is possible
that Congress could enact substantive law governing the dispute un-
der the Commerce Clause.'"'
97 Mishkin, 53 Colum L Rev at 192 (cited in note 16).
98 Marcos, 806 F2d at 352.
99 See Torres, 113 F3d at 543 (noting that the plaintiff's tort suit struck at Peru's "sovereign
interest" and therefore implicated "important foreign policy concerns").
IWx) Note that this theory is similar to the approach advocated by Justice Jackson before the
label "protective jurisdiction" was developed. See National Mutual Insurance Co v Tidewater
Transfer Co, 337 US 582,602 (1949):
[T]he power to make this defendant suable by a District citizen is not claimed to be outside
of federal competence. If Congress has power to bring the defendant from his home all the
way to a forum within the District, there seems little basis for denying it power to require
him to meet the plaintiff part way in another forum.
IM This is true despite the Supreme Court's recent cases limiting the reach of the Com-
merce Clause. See United States v Morrison, 529 US 598,627 (2000) (invalidating portions of the
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Thus, Marcos and Torres present crucial elements of both
Wechsler's and Mishkin's versions of protective jurisdiction. More-
over, the federal common law of foreign relations does not provide
the element of federal law necessary to satisfy either § 1331 or Article
III. As discussed above, the fact that these suits were based upon state
law suggests that they cannot be understood as an application of the
well-pleaded complaint rule."'2 Each case involved a cause of action
based on state rather than federal law: Marcos was a state law action
for conversion, while Dole and Torres were both state tort suits. Thus,
at a minimum, there is no statutory basis for jurisdiction in these cases,
since § 1331 does not apply.
The more difficult question is whether these cases even fall within
the constitutional bounds of Article III's "arising under" jurisdiction.
The expansive definition that Chief Justice Marshall provided in
Osborn would allow jurisdiction in any case where federal law forms
an ingredient. Therefore, Article III would be satisfied if the federal
common law of foreign relations were raised by either party. However,
even under this expansive view of Article III's reach, it is difficult to
identify the federal ingredient in either Torres or Marcos. Neither
court directly addressed what substantive law applied in the case.'"" In
Torres, as well as several district court cases, the courts were able to
avoid this question because they simply dismissed the suits on the ba-
sis of forum non conveniens."" Even the Marcos court, which actually
considered the merits of the plaintiff's request for a preliminary in-
junction, did not specify whether state or federal law applied."", In or-
der to avoid this question, the Second Circuit simply purported to ap-
ply both state and federal substantive law:
If the overall claim is one based on state law, it is clearly suffi-
cient under the New York law stated above. Even if the claim is
one under federal common law, it would still be sufficient if state
law is adopted as the federal common law, as is appropriate in
Violence Against Women Act on the grounds that it exceeded Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment); Lopez, 514 US 549 (holding that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause).
102 See Part lI.B.
103 See Torres, 113 F3d 540; Marcos, 806 F2d at 354-56. But see In re World War I! Era Japa-
nese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F Supp 2d 939, 943-44 (ND Cal 2000) (finding jurisdiction
based on the federal common law of foreign relations and relying on the Treaty of Peace with
Japan for the governing substantive law).
M4 See Torres, 113 F3d at 541. See also Sequihua v Texaco, 847 F Supp 61,65 (SD Tex 1994)
(declining to exercise jurisdiction over tort claims brought by Ecuadorian citizens on grounds of
comity and forum non conveniens).
105 See Marcos, 806 F2d at 354-56.
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cases such as this where adoption of state law does not conflict
with federal policy.'"
This judicial sidestep allowed the court to rely on state law in the end.
Indeed, the crucial factor in each case is that the federal common law
does not appear to govern any aspect of the dispute. The role of the
common law in each case is illusory; it is offered not to provide a rule
of decision, but only to signal that the case has possible foreign policy
implications. The result is to allow federal question jurisdiction over
state causes of action where no federal law is implicated. Quite obvi-
ously, there is no basis for jurisdiction in such a case; since there is no
federal law at issue (and therefore no "arising under" jurisdiction),
and the cases do not otherwise fall within Article 1II, there is no con-
stitutional ground for jurisdiction. Since Congress cannot authorize-
and courts cannot permit-jurisdiction beyond the bounds of Article
III, these cases represent an unconstitutional extension of judicial
power.
C. Problems with Protective Jurisdiction over Cases Implicating U.S.
Foreign Affairs
Classifying these cases as a form of protective jurisdiction helps
crystallize several problems with resting jurisdiction solely on a suit's
possible impact on U.S. foreign relations. "7 Specifically, this approach
raises federalism concerns, unnecessarily interjects uncertainty into
the determination of jurisdiction, and expands judicial discretion in
matters outside the federal judiciary's traditional areas of expertise.
106 ld at 356. Note that this judicial parsing was also necessary because the court never re-
solved whether the state cause of action was completely preempted and thus governed by fed-
eral common law. See id at 354.
107 At least one other commentator has recognized that cases resting jurisdiction on the
federal common law of foreign relations use a form of protective jurisdiction. See Erin Elizabeth
Terrell, Note, Foreign Relations and Federal Questions: Resolving the Judicial Split on Federal
Court Jurisdiction, 35 Vand J Transnatl L 1637 (2002) (using the term "quasi-protective jurisdic-
tion"). The author goes on to argue that Congress should expand § 1331 to allow for federal ju-
risdiction in cases where the State Department certifies that there are important U.S. interests at
stake. But this solution simply begs the question (which the commentator addresses only in pass-
ing): would such an extension be constitutional? In my view, such a statute would not pass consti-
tutional muster. The only federal law at issue would be the jurisdictional statute. There is a plau-
sible argument under Verlinden B. V v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480 (1983), that a com-
plex statute that requires a court to apply substantive federal law in every case before determin-
ing jurisdiction would present a federal question. However, a statute that simply tells courts to
defer to the State Department is unlikely to qualify as substantive federal law sufficient to satisfy
Article III.
Such a statute also raises separation of powers concerns by allowing jurisdiction only with
the blessing of the executive branch. The problems inherent in such an approach led to its aban-
donment in the area of foreign sovereign immunity with the passage of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891, codified in relevant part at 28 USC
§ 1602 et seq (2000).
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1. Federalism concerns.
As discussed above, jurisdiction in Marcos and Torres cannot be
easily reconciled with the well-pleaded complaint rule. The federal
common law of foreign relations, if relevant to these suits at all, is
raised only by defendants who argue that these suits are important to
U.S interests. Moreover, if the federal common law is not implicated
by these suits at all-which I have argued is the better reading of both
Sabbatino and these cases-there is no federal law for the purposes of
Article III. Without federal law to interpret, there is no need for the
uniformity created by allowing federal courts to hear these claims. In
essence, federal courts are using protective jurisdiction to deprive
state courts of the opportunity to interpret and apply state law based
on a federal interest that is purely speculative.
Interfering with a state's interpretation of its own law is a serious
matter, and the Supreme Court has required explicit statutory au-
thorization before concluding that Congress intended to interfere with
state prerogatives."" However, courts resting jurisdiction on some
speculative concern for U.S. foreign relations are setting aside these
federalism concerns without any statutory basis, let alone an explicit
congressional authorization."" In the paradigmatic case of protective
jurisdiction there is at least a congressional statute that purports to au-
thorize federal jurisdiction over state law claims.'"' Jurisdiction based
on the federal common law of foreign relations adds an additional
constitutional problem: the courts, not Congress, have identified the
federal interest that requires the protection of federal jurisdiction.
Finally, as Judge Kozinski pointed out, there is no reason to be-
lieve that these cases will have significantly less impact on U.S. foreign
108 See, for example, Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 461 (1991) (applying a "plain state-
ment rule" to determine whether Congress intended to infringe on states' sovereignty as "an ac-
knowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional
scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere"); Atascadero State Hospital v
Scanlon, 473 US 234,243 (1985) ("[I]t is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Con-
gress' intent before finding that federal law overrides the guarantees of the Eleventh Amend-
ment. The requirement that Congress unequivocally express the intention in the statutory lan-
guage ensures such certainty.").
109 Even if one accepts the theory of protective jurisdiction, it probably represents the outer
boundary of the constitutional grant of federal question jurisdiction. Typically, courts try to avoid
deciding or creating unnecessary constitutional questions. Thus, at the very least, courts should
avoid interpreting Sabbatino in such a way as to push the limits of Article I11. See, for example,
NLRB v Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 US 490, 500 (1979) (discussing the canon of constitu-
tional avoidance).
111) A possible recent example of such a statute is the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act § 408(b)(3), Pub L No 107-42, 115 Stat 230 (2001), codified at 49 USC § 40101
(2000 & Supp 2002). Under the Act, all lawsuits arising out of the events of September 11 must
be brought in the Southern District of New York. See Eric J. Segall, Article III as a Grant of
Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 54 Fla L Rev 361,384-85 (2002)
(arguing that this jurisdictional grant is an appropriate exercise of protective jurisdiction).
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affairs if litigated in federal rather than state courts.'" More plausibly,
jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign affairs will
merely serve as a vehicle for defendants to evade state court jurisdic-
tion."2 While defendants may generally prefer federal court, there is
little reason to believe that state courts will be any less competent to
handle cases with a speculative impact on U.S. foreign affairs. Indeed,
given that the core of these cases will still be governed by state sub-
stantive law, the opposite may be true.
Neither Sabbatino itself nor subsequent Supreme Court case law
has ordained such a sweeping judicial intrusion on state autonomy. To
the contrary, the Court has emphasized in recent years that the politi-
cal branches, not the courts, have responsibility for striking the right
balance between state and federal interests in foreign affairs. '" For ex-
ample, the Court recently rejected a challenge to California's multina-
tional corporate tax on the grounds that it undermined U.S. foreign re-
lations and frustrated efforts of the federal government to speak with
"one voice."'"4 Despite the international outcry created by the Califor-
nia statute, the Court declined to preempt the state law, emphasizing
that it was the responsibility of "Congress-whose voice, in this area,
is the Nation's-to evaluate whether the national interest is best
served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy.'' Moreover, Congress
has consistently shown sensitivity to state autonomy in regulating for-
eign affairs. For example, the Senate has frequently attached a "feder-
alism understanding" to human rights treaties as a condition of con-
sent. ' These measures are designed to ensure that these treaty
obligations do not alter the balance of power between state and fed-
II I See Patrickson, 251 F3d at 803.
112 See Lumen N. Mulligan, Note, No Longer Safe at Home: Preventing the Misuse of Fed-
eral Common Law of Foreign Relations as a Defense Tactic in Private Transnational Litigation,
100 Mich L Rev 2408,2450 (2002) (arguing that defendants "have used the federal common law
of foreign relations to manufacture federal question jurisdiction to escape on the merits defenses
of state tort actions brought by foreign plaintiffs").
113 The Supreme Court's recent decision in American Insurance Association v Garamendi,
123 S Ct 2374 (2003), does not tip the balance toward wholesale federalization of foreign affairs.
Garamendi stands for the rather well-established proposition that executive agreements preempt
conflicting state law. See, for example, United States v Pink, 315 US 203, 230-31 (1942); United
States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 327, 331 (1937). See also note 46.
114 See Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 US 298, 331 (1994)
(upholding the constitutionality of California's multinational corporate tax). See also Bradley
and Goldsmith, 92 Am J Intl L at 677-78 (cited in note 80) (discussing the Court's decision in
Barclays).
115 Barclays,512 US at 331.
116 See Bradley and Goldsmith, 92 Am J Intl L at 677 (cited in note 80) ("The Senate has
consistently attached both a 'federalism understanding' and a "non-self-executing' declaration as
a condition of its consent to these treaties."). Professors Goldsmith and Bradley also note that
the federal government incorporated state concerns into the implementation of the GATT and
NAFTA trade agreements. Id at 678.
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eral governments."' The courts resting jurisdiction on the federal
common law of foreign relations have overlooked the deference to
states typically accorded by the political branches. None of the opin-
ions even mentions the intrusion on states as a factor weighing against
the exercise of jurisdiction. In sum, allowing jurisdiction based solely
on a suit's speculative impact on U.S. foreign affairs is inconsistent
with the respect for federalism traditionally shown by both the courts
and Congress.
2. Jurisdictional uncertainty.
Beyond the federalism concerns, there is a larger problem with
this form of protective jurisdiction. Because of their inexperience with
foreign affairs, courts lack the institutional capability to systemically
evaluate whether the federal common law of foreign relations is trig-
gered in a given case. Federal question jurisdiction based on the invo-
cation of the federal common law of foreign relations must inevitably
turn on each court's individual analysis of whether a case implicates
U.S. foreign relations. Even assuming courts are generally competent
to make such an evaluation (a dubious assumption, as discussed be-
low), it is unclear what factors a court should consider in determining
whether a case implicates important U.S. interests. This open-ended
inquiry unnecessarily interjects an element of uncertainty into federal
question jurisdiction.
This uncertainty is illustrated by the approach adopted by the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. In Torres, the court relied on the Peruvian
government's protests to determine that the case was important to
U.S. foreign affairs.'" The Eleventh Circuit adopted this reasoning in
Pacheco de Perez v AT&T,"9 but concluded that jurisdiction was inap-
propriate because the Venezuelan government had not weighed in.''
Left to assess U.S. foreign affairs interests on its own, the Eleventh
Circuit has essentially held that federal question jurisdiction now
turns on whether a foreign government complains.'2' Inviting foreign
governments to play a role in a federal court's determination of juris-
diction actually increases the possibility that a foreign government will
117 See id at 677.
118 113 F3d at 543 (noting that the Peruvian government's -vigorousness in opposing this
action ... has alerted us to the foreign policy issues implicated by this case").
119 139 F3d 1368,1378 (11th Cir 1998).
120 See id.
121 Compare Patrickson, 251 F3d at 804:
Assuming that foreign relations are an appropriate consideration at all, the relevant ques-
tion is not whether the foreign government is pleased or displeased by the litigation, but
how the case affects the interests of the United States. This is an inherently political judg-
ment. one that courts-whether state or federal-are not competent to make.
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be offended: inevitably, there will be instances where jurisdiction is
not exercised, despite official protests. Such a case-by-case approach
would eliminate any predictability in federal question jurisdiction,
which runs counter to the entire purpose of the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule.
3. Expanding judicial discretion under the guise of protecting
federal interests.
The final problem with jurisdiction based on some speculative
impact on U.S. foreign affairs is that it unnecessarily aggregates power
to the federal courts at the expense of the political branches and state
courts. Jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign rela-
tions is premised on the idea that important federal interests require a
federal forum. This approach also assumes that federal courts will be
more sensitive to U.S. foreign affairs than their state counterparts. As
discussed above, this supposition is, at best, unsupported.'2  More im-
portant, however, is that the courts are reserving for themselves the
determination of whether a case is important enough to merit jurisdic-
tion.
This judicial land grab presents several problems. First, it seems in
tension with several other judicial doctrines designed to minimize ju-
dicial interference in U.S. foreign affairs. For example, the political
question doctrine serves to limit adjudication of foreign affairs dis-
putes implicating the other branches.'23 Similarly, Sabbatino's act of
state doctrine serves to minimize the possibility that courts will inter-
fere with U.S. foreign relations by questioning the validity of a foreign
sovereign's act in its own territory. ' Each of these doctrines is de-
signed to limit the judicial role in cases implicating international rela-
tions. Jurisdiction under the federal common law of foreign affairs
would have precisely the opposite effect. It would make a district
122 See Part III.A.
123 See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 211-13 (1962) (discussing the political question doctrine
in the context of foreign relations). Although the political question doctrine is dormant in the
domestic context, it is alive and well in foreign affairs cases. See, for example, Antolok v United
States, 873 F2d 369, 379 (DC Cir 1989) (refusing to reach the merits of a claim because "the Dis-
trict Court was without jurisdiction over this matter of international relations by reason of the
political question doctrine"); Smith v Reagan, 844 F2d 195, 199 (4th Cir 1988) (applying the po-
litical question doctrine to a claim brought under the Hostage Act). See generally Jack L. Gold-
smith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U Colo L Rev 1395, 1403
(1999) ("[A]lthough the political question doctrine has fallen into general desuetude since
Baker, it is frequently applied in the foreign relations field.").
124 See Part 1.B.2. The Charming Betsy canon is another example. This canon of interpreta-
tion states that courts will not presume that Congress intended to violate international law. See
Murray v The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 US (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating that "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible con-
struction remains").
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court's independent analysis of the U.S. interests a prerequisite to ju-
risdiction in every case.
Second, even if one accepts that courts are empowered to make
these determinations as a doctrinal matter, there is no reason to be-
lieve they are well-positioned to do so.'2' Judges typically lack the dip-
lomatic experience and expertise necessary to make these determina-
tions. Institutionally, courts are poorly situated to gather the necessary
information and intelligence or to consult with the relevant govern-
ment stakeholders required for an informed decision. These pragmatic
concerns counsel against expanding a constitutionally questionable ju-
risdictional approach that frees courts to make judgments for which
they are ill-equipped.
CONCLUSION
Although several courts have found jurisdiction based on the fed-
eral common law of foreign relations, these decisions cannot be fully
explained as applications of the well-pleaded complaint rule. These
courts have failed to recognize that state causes of action raise federal
questions only in narrow circumstances. Moreover, these cases fail to
identify even the minimal ingredient of federal law sufficient to satisfy
Article III. Under close scrutiny, jurisdiction based on the federal
common law of foreign relations cannot be justified as an exercise of
federal question jurisdiction.
These cases are best explained as a type of protective jurisdic-
tion-suits based on state law heard in a federal forum to protect
American foreign interests. When jurisdiction under the federal com-
mon law of foreign relations is properly understood as protective ju-
risdiction, it cannot be squared with the statutory requirements of
§ 1331 nor the broader constitutional limits of Article III. Allowing
125 See Goldsmith, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1396-97 (cited in note 123). Professor Goldsmith ar-
gues that the Supreme Court initially made a similar mistake in the political question and act of
state areas. By moving back toward a formal (rather than functional) approach to applying these
doctrines, courts have begun to minimize the judicial role in foreign affairs once again. This trend
is not certain to continue. In Professor Goldsmith's analysis, the end of the Cold War was an im-
portant factor in the reinvigoration of formalism in foreign affairs. During times of heightened
tension, the risks of over- and underinclusiveness presented by a rule-based approach might
seem too great. Id at 1409. Thus, the dangers of a post-September 1lth world may increase the
appeal of functionalism once again.
It is also possible that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Garamendi, 123 S Ct 2374, her-
alds a return toward a more functional approach in foreign affairs cases. The Court eschewed a
rule-based approach and focused on the effects the California statute would have on the federal
government's ability to conduct diplomacy. However, it is possible that Garamendi merely repre-
sents Justice Souter's stylistic preferences. A more narrow reading of the opinion is that the
Court was not abandoning formalism, but simply evaluating the conflict between the California
statute and various executive agreements.
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protective jurisdiction based solely on a suit's speculative impact on
U.S. foreign affairs unnecessarily interferes with state sovereignty. Fi-
nally, this form of protective jurisdiction creates uncertainty by allow-
ing the scope of federal jurisdiction to turn on a federal court's often
misguided and uninformed view of what is best for U.S. foreign policy
interests.
